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ABSTRACT 
In the past, little attention has been paid to the socio-psychological dimension of the phenomenon of severe poverty in 
Africa. Despite the institutional nature of the global economic order, including policies of the European Union, the World 
Trade Organisation, and the International Monetary Fund, it is people who design, support, and maintain this system, and 
individual constructions of the world and structural inequalities that reinforce one another. This also finds its expression in 
different ways, e.g. people‟s social representations of severe poverty in Europe‟s former colonies (Park, 2008, 2011). This 
article investigates, how we, members of the European middle class, construct ourselves as ethical beings in the context 
of African poverty: What is the link between our social representations, identity construction and (in)action with regard to 
severe poverty in Africa? What are the discursive mechanisms we apply in the construction of an ethical self and what is 
the notion of the „African Other‟? In a nutshell: What do our social represenations make us do? 
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INTRODUCTION  
The clandestine power of dominant discourses is to create an invisible normality. Part of the contemporary European 
normality is a global institutional order under which at least 46% of humankind live below the poverty line as defined by the 
World Bank. According to these calculations from UNICEF (2003), it would only take an additional 7 billion US dollars (to 
the money officially already available) over a period of 10 years to give all children between 6 and 15 years a school 
education. To put these figures into perspective: 7 billion dollars is less than Europeans (of the 15 member states of the 
European Union before the enlargement of 1st of May 2004) spend per year on ice-cream (Ziegler, 2005, p. 84). 
Regardless of whether one considers severe poverty as a phenomenon caused by rich countries and chooses the 
approach of justice and redistribution, or whether one prefers to join the charity discourse and chooses the approach of aid 
and help, one question remains: How do we1, people living in Europe, construct ourselves as ethical beings in the context 
of global/African poverty? What is the link between our social representations, identity construction and (in)action with 
regard to severe poverty?2 
Social Representations Theory  
In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of an individual‟s social representation of African poverty, it is necessary 
to gain a deeper understanding of which discourses these representations refer to and from where they are fed from. For 
what lies at the heart of one‟s representation, and the question of one‟s personal activity, is basically one‟s personal 
response to all big questions of human existence: What do I believe is a good life? (Taylor, 1989; Tsirogianni et al., 2012) 
What do I think is the meaning of life and how do I want to achieve this in the context of the existing contradictions present 
in our European societies? Furthermore, questions such as: Do I believe that something like „human nature‟ exists, and if 
so, do I believe that humans are egoists by nature or rather by nurture? – What do we merely acquire because we need it 
for our self-image and the construction of an ethical self, and how do actually we live? 
Moral reactions 
One issue which is underrepresented in Social Representations Theory (Moscovici, 1984) is the notion of emotions and 
therefore also the link between cognition and emotion with a special focus on moral reactions (Park, 2007a). Traditionally, 
moral psychologists assumed that moral judgment involves a deliberate process of reasoning and reflection. According to 
this rationalist account, emotional reactions associated with moral judgments are caused by moral reasoning and can also 
be changed by altering one‟s reasoning (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1965). The adherents of the intuition-based model point 
out that however logically reasonable this account might seem to be, it does not explain several empirical findings. Haidt‟s 
(2001) main point is that most judgments and behaviours appear to be formed automatically and with little intention, 
awareness or effort. Furthermore, conscious reasoning seems to be the consequence of these unconscious behaviours 
and judgments rather than the cause of them. Motivational biases seem to chronically distort reasoning in such a way that 
people reason to support a pre-existing decision rather than analyse it logically or rationally. Finally, there exists only a 
weak relationship between moral reasoning and moral action. Haidt stresses that even when moral reasoning correlates 
with moral action, this weak correlation can be almost entirely explained by a covariation with intelligence. In brief: moral 
judgments are based upon rapid and automatic emotional responses to morally relevant stimuli, and moral reasoning is 
„only‟ a post hoc explanation or justification of these emotional reactions.  
These automatic evaluations are certainly dependent on one‟s representations, the content of the actual subject, and are 
linked to the current goals related to the issue and the desired outcome; they are based on an egocentric assessment of 
what is good or bad from one‟s own perspective. Outcomes that benefit oneself and fit into one‟s representations of the 
subject invoke positive automatic evaluations; whereas outcomes that hurt and represent a threat to the self, invoke a 
negative automatic evaluation. “These automatic egocentric evaluations are then seen as valid representations of reality, 
and opposing viewpoints as self-interested distortions,” (Epley & Caruso, 2004, p. 178). 
METHODOLOGY 
This study rests on three insights: a) People construct their identities around an abstract notion of good (Taylor, 1989; 
Tsirogianni & Gaskell, 2011); b) Everyone constructs their identity in opposition to an „other‟ (Mouffe, 2005); and c) The 
insights of the intuition-based model of moral reactions (Haidt, 2001). Taking these insights as a starting point, I conducted 
semi-structured interviews with 20 Europeans (12 males, 8 females) in Berlin, London and Cape Town, with whom I met 
between 1 and 12 times. Half of the interviewees had work experiences or worked during the time of the interview for 
NGOs and institutions working towards structural change and global justice or for charity organisation helping the 
„wretched of the earth‟; the other half of the interviewees had never taken on any activity in this regard. Every interview 
lasted from 1 to 2.5 hours, out of which I analysed 36 hours‟ worth of transcribed material. Criteria for Interviewees were 
being of white ethnicity, between 25 and 40 years‟ old, raised in „old rich‟ European countries, holding a university degree 
and not having financial commitments (e.g. no elderly parents to care for, no children). I used NVIVO as a technical tool, 
and Discourse Analysis (Gill, 2000; Parker, 2005) as theoretical tools.  
                                                          
1
 The consequent use of the terms „we‟ and „I‟, which might be rather unusual in an academic paper, is meant to represent that I do not 
wish to exclude myself from the researched group and is aimed at preventing this paper developing a „sour moral undertone‟. 
2
 This article is based on an earlier version which was published as Park (2009). 
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To probe the interviewees‟ social representations of severe poverty and their personal positioning towards it, I used a 
short story as a moral stimulus with regard to the „African Other‟:ss 
In the film Central Station, Dora is a retired school teacher who makes a modest living sitting at the station writing 
letters for illiterate people. Suddenly she has an opportunity to earn $1000. All she has to do is persuade a homeless 
nine-year old boy to follow her to an address she has been given. She is told that he will be adopted by wealthy 
couples. She delivers the boy, gets the money, and spends it on a television. Her neighbour spoils her good mood by 
telling her that the boy is too old to be adopted. She says that he will be killed and his organs sold for transplantation. 
Perhaps Dora was aware of this possibility all along, but was able to block it out of her mind. 
One of the questions of my topic guide was: What are the differences and/or similarities between Dora‟s and our situation 
as individuals in Europe when we, for example, buy clothes which are produced in sweatshops?3 - The question of 
whether one sees parallels between Dora‟s conduct and that of consumers in Europe buying clothes produced under 
unfair conditions presupposes already a certain social representation of the world which is embedded in a particular 
discourse. According to Rawls (1971), it would be factually wrong to draw this analogy, because international relations are 
fundamentally different to relations between compatriots. One of my claims is that the question of similarities and parallels 
to European consumers only makes sense to the interviewees if they adopt a transnational perspective rather than think in 
terms of national boundaries. Another issue is, do people take on the perspective of Dora, a person who unintentionally, 
unpurposefully, may have contributed to the suffering of the boy? In other words: do they focus on Dora‟s intentions? Or 
do they focus on the outcome and the consequences for the boy? What becomes their reference parameter? The crucial 
point about this vignette is that it entails elements which allow – from a certain specific position of the world – the 
relationship between the person who is advantaged and the other person, who may have ended up in a less fortunate 
situation, to be constructed as a relational one.  
A major part of the convenience which we in rich countries enjoy would be impossible without the exploitation of natural 
resources and human labour in poor countries; if the conditions under which our consumer goods are produced were 
different, even the European middle class could not afford the lifestyle to which we are accustomed. To offer one example: 
if clothes were produced under ethically fair conditions, we would not be able to replace our allegedly „o ld-fashioned‟ 
clothes according to fashion seasons. Still, one could argue that it is almost impossible to avoid buying unethically 
produced clothes in Western Europe. But from this fact it does not follow that it is therefore morally right to buy them and 
to save the money one would have spent otherwise if one bought the same (more expensive) clothes produced under 
ethical conditions. It is an open question what a morally defensible action could be; according to Pogge (2005) it would be 
making up for „reaping the harvest‟, for example, by giving the money we „saved‟ to a group working on poverty relief and 
structural change.  
Typology4 
Based on an analysis of the interviews, we developed a typology of six types (see: Appendix 1), whereby the concept of 
type only refers to its most basic understanding of functioning according to the all-or-none principle. The point is that the 
order of the types remains the same, regardless of which of the following lines the continuum is created: how much do 
people combat what they consider to be the reasons for severe poverty, what and how (passionately) do people report to 
feel about severe poverty, or how do people construct the „African Other‟ and talk about severely impoverished people in 
general.  
Typology: I Cosmopolitans, II Political Activists, III Religious Believers by Self-Definition5 (IV Believers in a Just World, V 
Representatives of the Middle Class), VI Neoliberal Aspirant High Achievers; 
I________________II________________III_________________IV_________________V__________________VI 
Combat what they consider to be the reasons for severe poverty                                                           no action 
Feel strongly/report to experience a diverse range of emotions                                             feel nothing 
Africans as equals                                               Africans as „others‟ 
According to our analysis, there are three components and if all of them are part of one‟s social representations of severe 
poverty in Africa, it seems to be inevitable that one is engaged and active against global injustices: a) If people take 
responsibility for the past, b) if people feel empowered to act and take responsibility to influence future political discourses, 
and c) if one constructs the „African Other‟ as an equal and not as morally inferior. 
Or more precisely: Firstly, it seems to be „easy‟ (in the sense of: not necessarily requiring action) to take responsibility for 
the past, as long as one feels helpless to do something about the future. This would result in statements like: „It is my fault, 
I caused it, I am sorry – but you know that there is nothing I could do about it‟. Secondly, it seems to be „easy‟ to 
acknowledge one‟s ability to do something about the future if one does not feel responsible for its causes. This would 
                                                          
3
 I used the keyword “sweatshop”. Most interviewees answered my question if I asked them about „child labour‟. 
4
 I am highly aware that psychologists have the reputation of creating stage models, rankings etc. in which it just happens that the 
researchers themselves appear on the highest stage, together with Jesus, Ghandi and Martin Luther King. The criteria for the ones on the 
„highest rank‟, the cosmopolitans, came out of the data; the criteria are so narrow that I would not fulfil them. 
5
 Christians, who define themselves by their Christian identity, describing themselves as: “My religious beliefs are of high importance and 
are my main guidelines in life.” 
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correspond to statements like: „I could do something about it, but I did not cause it. Why should I do anything?‟ Thirdly, it 
seems to be „easy‟ to take responsibility and to acknowledge one‟s ability to do something about the future, as long as „the 
other‟ is constructed as an inferior „other‟. This would be represented by statements like: „It was my fault, I could do 
something about it, but the issue is so minor, why do you even want to talk about it?‟ Part of the ethical self-construction in 
the context of global poverty seems to be that it is psychologically impossible for people holding representations in which 
the following three factors come together: a) it was our fault, we caused it b) we have the power to do something about the 
future and c) The „global poor‟ are like us. These three beliefs do not co-exist, so resulting in the outcome: just leave the 
world like it is and let/keep making the „African Equals‟ suffer and die. 
In this article we will only introduce interviewees who stated to consider global poverty to be one of the most pressing 
contemporary problems which are types I, II, and III; the analysis of type VI is shown in order to contrast the first three 
types. The types IV and V do not occur because they do not fulfil the criterion given for this article.  
Type I: the Cosmopolitans 
These subscribe to all three components given above: 
a) They believe that severe poverty is a phenomenon produced by „us‟. Using a highly emotional language, they state: 
“Europe and the US, the main economic entities, screw up the economies of the poor countries.” (Francesco) Or “we are 
doing the same in a different way than when we were colonialists,” (Marcus). B) They believe that they personally can 
contribute to the required change. The construction of reasons for poverty already entail ways for potential solutions to 
which they as individuals can and do contribute: “Even small actions, buy fair trade products, sign petitions.” C) They 
construct the „African Other‟ as equal and in genereal, report to experience not only a cascade of emotions but also a 
much broader variety of emotions than any of the other interivewees: anger, outrage, sadness, guilt, shame. 
“They are quite reserved, the Massai, like the British, and they sort of reminded me of the Scottish. They wear sort 
of tartan and stuff, you learn they have fashion the same as we do but it is different, (…) They have similar values, 
money is still important to them, status is important, so there are certain unifying sort of attitudes they have just like 
the English.” (Marcus) 
What is salient here is how closely Marcus constructs the Massai to himself: he describes himself as being half Scottish on 
his father‟s side, being born in England and defining himself as British. Talking about his self-assessed competences while 
working voluntarily in his trained profession in Tanzania, he uses an infant metaphor to describe himself; he ascribes the 
„African Other‟ a position for themselves, so that in a setting where the „African Equal‟ are the majority, he has a shifting 
position: 
“You feel like a baby, like a child. You can't really communicate anything sophisticated. In your own country, you are 
pretty well-read, but then you go to another country, and you just can't, I felt really stupid.” (Marcus) 
Being confronted with severely impoverished people, Marcus reflects how certain emotions motivated him to do (even 
more) unpaid work in his trained profession: How did it make you feel to be confronted with people living in severely 
impoverished conditions? 
“That is really shitty, actually that is part of my motivation to do the voluntary work: when I was in India, you see 
people on the street, big cities where it is just like hell to live in and you can't really do anything about it, really. I mean 
you can give money to people but that doesn‟t really help them in the long run so I thought I wanted to do something 
and [the decision to do voluntary work] was an empowerment thing for me as well. […] I hate that guilt thing. I found, 
in a way when you see so much poverty, that your compassion has to go on hold because you can't do anything 
about it, it‟s frustrating, fucking hell, I felt so powerless. The only way to deal with it is by closing off your feelings, 
taking away your compassion and then getting it back later and trying to do something about it, that helped me.” 
(Marcus) 
But what is „it‟ precisely that he perceives and which makes him feel so strongly that he feels the urge to withdraw his 
compassion? Why do these emotions linger so strongly, or why does the mechanism of „out of sight, out of mind‟ not 
function in his case? What is this “hell” he has seen? The crucial point about severe poverty and misery is that it goes 
beyond the state of privation, because it inescapably reduces humans to their most basic physical aspects. Certain 
physical needs cannot be ignored and thus subjugate humans – independent of status, class, race or gender – to a 
tyranny (Arendt, 1963; Park, 2011a). And I would like to claim that it was this „tyranny‟ which Marcus meant when he 
described it as “just like hell to live in”. The assumption suggests itself that the experienced emotions may be 
disgrace/dishonour and shame. According to Kant, the origin of an emotion like shame is a situation of 
defamation/dishonour and expresses outrage about a humiliating situation; a situation which contradicts an original right 
every human has by virtue of humanity. This is summarised by Ziegler (2005) as: “I feel shame about the ignominy, which 
is done to others and disgrace for my own blotted honour as a human being,” (p. 12). 
If just behaviour is a means of gaining approval and respect from ourselves and others (Deutsch & Steil 1988), what does 
it mean for the individual psyche to construct severe poverty not as a humanitarian catastrophe but as an unjust situation 
„made by us‟? What are the consequences of such an „inner/emotional world‟ for one‟s world-view? How does it make one 
feel about one’s own world (Europe), and how does one have to re-construct one‟s view of an ethical Europe, the core – 
Europe‟s moral backbone? Are we all victims of a huge deception? Does this deception include all the stories we were told 
when we were children, stories which constituted our categories of good or bad and right or wrong? Do stories which we 
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were told in kindergarten, at school and later at university, stories which we read when we open the newspaper, or hear 
when we switch on the television, need to be reconstructed? Does this reconstruction go down to the deepest layer of 
what constitutes Europe (Park, 2007; Kilomba, 2007)?  
And interviewees of this type can only think of similarities between Dora and European consumers: 
“Yes, this is a big issue. Our behaviour is very similar to Dora‟s because we have been knowing for a long time that so 
many goods are produced in developing countries by using child labour. Yes, we, like Dora, didn't go back to that place 
and take the child with her. […] I can‟t describe how I feel, it is so unjust.” (Francesco) 
Type VI: the Neoliberal Aspirant High Achievers 
These acknowledge the first two components and openly reject the third one: a) They believe that severe poverty is a 
phenomenon produced by rich countries – and report they do not associate any emotions with it: “Maybe I am just cold or 
something, but [being confronted with extremely impoverished people] doesn‟t make me feel anything.” b) They believe 
that they could contribute to the required change if they wanted to – but don‟t want to and openly say that they are not in 
favour of a political change: “The global institutional order is not just, but then you are also selfish and think about your 
own economy and it is good for us … therefore, I would say leave it like it is.” c) They refer to animal metaphors, e.g. 
monkeys and donkeys, and say openly that they believe that the „African Other‟ is of less value than a European person: “I 
think one life here [in Africa] is not really as valuable as in the Netherlands,” (Mia). Related to this dehumanisation, the 
acknowledgement of the impact of colonisation and contemporary politics can coexist with blaming the „African Other‟ for 
the reasons of poverty: Africans are described as too lazy, too slow, crawling along, incompetent to work in proper jobs 
like Europeans do and they refer to “African genes”, “evolution” and “African culture” for the reasons for this (see: 
Appendix II). 
“For sure there are parallels; [in our case] it is even stronger than in the story, we have the evidence that they have to 
work under horrible conditions, but I guess, we are very rational. She will probably compare and weigh up her new fancy 
television to her feeling of guilt, so we do a bit the same.” (Matt) 
“I think the difference is the fact that it is anonymous; in both cases you are making money out of the fact that someone 
else is suffering. If you buy clothes for 9 Euros you know that it is made by a little kid from Taiwan, how else could it be 
done? You don‟t feel it if you buy it, the difference is really psychological, it doesn‟t touch you.” (Mia) 
What Cosmopolitans and Neoliberals have in common and what distinguishes them from the other types is the absence of 
a need to construct their conduct as ethically immaculate in this discourse; however, their reasons for doing so differ. The 
Cosmopolitans view matters and people as being either negatively or positively affected by the global institutional order, 
so that one is – without any moral implications – either a „victim‟ or a „perpetrator‟. The positioning as a „perpetrator‟ 
presupposes that one can bear the idea that our acts might have unintended harmful consequences for others. Hence, the 
point of reference is not „the lack of our evil intentions‟ but the unintended harmful consequences of our actions. 
Neoliberals, on the other hand, who construct the „African Other‟ openly as morally inferior, consider ethics as an obstacle 
to a successful life, instead believing in the „survival of the fittest‟. 
Still more interesting than the answers categorised under types I and VI are the ones given by interviewees with an 
apparent psychological need for an ethical self, who explicitly name global poverty when asked directly about their 
personal assessment of the most pressing problems faced by the world today. Interviewees categorised as types II and III 
claim to subscribe to the first two components to some degree. Furthermore, they claim to acknowledge the „poor Other‟ 
as equal, because they need it for their self-image, but in reality do not do so. 
In what follows, we will analyse the interviewees‟ answers and reveal their underlying logic. I wish neither to imply that 
there are no differences between our and Dora‟s situation, nor do I wish normatively to say that one has to construct the 
world in a similar way to Cosmopolitans or Neoliberals. However, according to the philosopher Jerome Neu (2000), many 
psychological problems are actually logical problems, and I would claim that – in this context – logical problems reveal and 
fulfil certain psychological functions. By getting into the intricacies of people‟s arguments, one reveals the degree of threat 
which the ethical self perceives.  
Type II: Political Activists 
These subscribe to some degree to components 1 and 2, claiming to consider the „African Other‟ as an equal but indeed 
constructing the „African Other‟ as „an Other‟: as superstitious, hyper-religious, incompetent, and selfish. Political Activists 
are not necessarily less engaged than Cosmopolitans, but they construct themselves as „warriors for the good‟, with a 
hegemonic view of the world and a strong construction of the „African Other‟ as an „Other‟. 
 “I think the directness is the difference; how aware you are of this because she did have directly an impact on this 
boy‟s life, whereas it is so natural for us to go into a shop and buy shoes - we don‟t often, people don‟t know, what is 
behind this pair of shoes, … Yes, it is negative, because it might be child labour behind it and slavery and stuff like 
that, but what is the alternative? You can't just go around and say no more child labour, because then they go into 
prostitution, and you are even more responsible because that is even worse than working in a sweatshop, … The 
directness [sic] of the impact gives you an excuse because you are sort of abstracting; it is actually quite convenient 
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because the guilt is divided up between every individual consumer and every individual person working for Nike as 
sort of being involved in that, so it is a collective guilt6 probably more than an individual guilt.” (Jenny) 
The unnamed veil which shrouds Jenny‟s entire statement is the core of similarity. She begins her comment with the 
statement that “the directness is the difference”, which implies that the issue might be the same at its core; followed by 
“the directness of the impact gives you an excuse”, “the guilt is divided up”, “so it is a collective guilt”. This indicates that 
she perceives many similarities; however this remains unspoken. In other words: in the way she constructs the 
differences, she also affirms the similarities. 
Excluding oneself: she switches from self-inclusive “we don‟t often” to self-excluding “people don‟t know”.  
Defence of her fellow citizens: While the Neoliberal points out that if one wants to know about the sweatshops, it can 
simply be derived from the price of the goods, in Jenny‟s case it is not so much about being capable of knowing it, or 
needing more background information, but about wanting to know it in the first place. By claiming that people are 
uninformed, Jenny defends her fellows. 
Weak expressions which mask: She uses a euphemism when commenting on issues like “child labour, slavery and stuff 
like that” as “negative.” 
Thinking in extreme binaries: She introduces a pseudo-comparison by the rhetorical question: “What is the alternative?” 
echoing a phrase popularised by Margaret Thatcher which came to be known as the TINA-principle: There Is No 
Alternative. The implied lack of alternatives provides a decisive mechanism: by constructing another extreme which seems 
to be even less justifiable, it puts the first option in a more acceptable light. And the pseudo-alternative she constructs is – 
what I coded as – a fantasy. Not any fantasy, but a very specific one: children as sex workers. Hence, the actual 
sweatshops become less threatening.  
Built-in „cracks‟ in one‟s logic: According to Jenny‟s logic of “you are even more responsible because that is even worse,” 
responsibility works like this: the more harm you do, the more you are responsible for it. One could argue that the role of 
child prostitute and the degree of suffering would be worse (an approach which might also say more about our attitudes 
towards sex work than about the reality of sweatshops) – but this would not have an impact on the extent of our actual 
responsibility. Jenny derives the lack of guilt European consumers feel toward the „global poor‟ from a lack of alternatives 
to participating in the global institutional order - two ideas which are mutually exclusive in her view. This is an approach 
guided by an invisible additional element: intention7.  
“If Dora was aware that it was quite likely that the boy was going to be killed; yes, you have to be quite selfish to do 
something where someone can be killed,…The important difference is, it depends on the motivation; if you do it 
mainly with the selfish motivation of saving money then, yes, that is an important parallel.” (Michael)  
What does it mean to put the focus on the consumer‟s intention, so that the consequences for the victims are only judged 
on the basis of our mind-set? On a psychological level, this means that the „Other‟ is only used for its function and 
importance to the self; without leaving one‟s own (white) position, it becomes the object of our psycho-hygienic needs 
without a position for itself. The object assumes a shifting position based on our subjectivity, our intentions. On a structural 
level, this construction of „the Other‟ can be interpreted as being part of a discourse which serves the function of stabilis ing 
the dominant system, a system in which no stranger and no „Other‟ exists outside of its function for the self (Tissberger, 
2007). 
The power of the mechanism of focussing on one‟s intentions lies in the fact that oneself is the one and only authority to 
judge whether one‟s intentions were right or wrong. In the context of the Dora vignette, one indicator that this mechanism 
is at work is that the interview passages became massively long, up to 3.5 transcribed pages in response to a single 
question, whereas responses in which this mechanism was not at work were only very few sentences long. This may 
already be an indicator of how much the ethical self was struggling to defend itself, how hard it was manoeuvring to come 
up with a narrative which would preserve and sustain the self as an ethical one when potentially directly attacked. 
“In our case, in order to avoid being an unethical shopper, it would probably be a full-time job, so there is a 
difference. I would feel guiltier in that instance, just because I would be forced to face it. I know it is not right. I know 
you can make a direct comparison; nevertheless, I choose to keep on shopping fairly indiscriminately. I try to worry 
about bigger things …The idea that you can change something by the way you consume is rubbish; it is a kind of 
compromise.” (Susan) 
Fantasy vs. open question: Susan speculates that being an ethical shopper would “probably” be a full-time job. This 
suggests that she has never tested it out. Actually, it is surprising how little time you really need to gather the required 
information for ethical shopping once and then to keep yourself updated (comparable to the literature research for a 
Ph.D.). This qualifies the sentence to be categorised as a fantasy. The underlying approach of this argumentation is: Child 
labour can be judged as being bad as long as it does not cause inconveniences for us.  
Building up of hierarchies: The assertion “I try to worry about bigger things” may be regarded as ambiguous. On the one 
hand, it can be seen as the building up of a hierarchy of issues based on perceived relative importance. When asked what 
                                                          
6
 Whether „collective guilt‟ actually exists or not may be open to debate. Hannah Arendt (1967) claims it does not exist. 
7
 I am open to suggestions that this point might be less a defence mechanism but primarily an expression of her hegemonic worldview – 
which is in itself a useful „defence‟. 
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she considers to be the most pressing contemporary problems, she names global poverty as number one. And then in this 
context, it becomes marginal and negligible. Or the statement may be interpreted to mean she wants to target bigger 
issues, such as agricultural subsidies. But how is it that in this context one excludes the other? Do such activities as 
buying fair trade products and lobbying politicians by definition mutually exclude each other? 
The global poor as a homogenous mass with the focus on the system („us‟): According to Susan, buying fair trade 
products is “rubbish” because it would only be a compromise in comparison to the required fundamental change the world 
needs. Improving working conditions for only a few people, while millions of others continue to live in severe poverty, is 
indeed an act of little consequences if the aim is to reduce the figures of the „global poor‟. But if one switches the focus 
from the system „us‟ to the individuals working in the sweatshops, one perceives that improved working conditions might 
mean the world to people affected by them (Pogge, 2002).  
Type III: Religious Believers by Self-Definition 
These subscribe to some degree the components of 1 and 2, and thinking of extremely poor people makes them feel “bad” 
as the only reported emotion. What can be seen most clearly here is what can also be framed as a general rule: if people, 
for example, refer to the discourse of responsibility in combination with a constraint like “a responsibility in some ways”, “a 
kind of responsibility” or also “poverty might be more or less caused by rich countries”, this constraint assumes the 
function and will be used at some point as an emergency exit, as a vehicle in one‟s discursive manoeuvring in one‟s 
ethical self-construction. Interviewees with an extensive psychological need to construct themselves as „ethical 
immaculate‟ and to construct every single action they perform to be ethical, show the highest degree of cognitive 
polyphasia (Jovchelovitch, 2002): the application of ideas from different belief systems in their ethical self-construction. For 
example, they use the same arguments for their personal defence which they use to blame their fellows for not doing 
enough or accuse European politicians for not doing enough and defending their inactivity in the next sentence. Claiming 
to perceive all people as part of humanity being related to each other and of equal worth, they construct the „African Other‟ 
as helpless, uneducated, backward and refer to a discourse, using a child metaphor for the description of the process of 
(de)colonisation, in which Africa as an entire continent becomes belittled:  
“It is like having a child and looking after them and telling them what to do, maybe not looking after them well but 
looking after them, and then leaving them, saying right, sort yourself out, now.” 
In their Religious Believers by Self-Definition show the highest degree of discoursive manoeuvring of all types in their 
reactions to the Dora Vignette: 
Do you think we are personally guilty? (Interviewer) 
“You could say that we are guilty; when we are buying running shoes, you could say that these are made by young 
kids, they are exploited, and you encourage those people, the boss, and the companies, to continuely exploit those 
kids. Yes, you are guilty, you are part of the action, your fault might be very minor but still … But we are educated in 
a way that forces us to buy those products … You don't feel guilty, otherwise you couldn't succeed8.” (John) 
Are you saying „we don't feel guilty‟ or „we are actually not guilty‟? (Interviewer) 
“We are actually not guilty as individuals. We are not promoting, we are just wearing running shoes because we have 
to. Don't buy anything which is produced in circumstances of exploitation, you couldn't become someone, you have 
to become someone that is the purpose of life, you want to be happy.” (John) 
Is it really impossible? (Interviewer) 
“It is possible but you would be like an animal; just the same, you couldn't be accepted by your peers. That is a need, 
a fundamental need, if you don't have something like a TV, some nice clothes, nobody would accept you; you have 
to follow some rules, for sure, if you are going off the track….” (John) 
First, he acknowledges the aspect of „being guilty and not feeling guilty‟, second he constructs himself as helpless and as 
being “[forced] to buy”, thirdly he introduces the theme “the purpose of life” which, fourthly, results in the implicit 
construction of our “fundamental needs” vs. „the fundamental needs of the poor‟: Their needs and rights become an 
obstacle in the fulfilment of our happiness. Religious Believers with the strongest need for an ethically immaculate self 
show, from all interviewees, the most extreme forms of cognitive polyphasia. 
CONCLUSION 
I followed the interviewees‟ intricacies and revealed their underlying rationalisations in order to show how the ethical self 
defends itself against the threat induced by a short story. What one can see in all quotes representing interviewees of 
types II and III is the moment of acknowledgement of similarities between Dora and our situation - just before 
rationalisations and other defence mechanisms are activated: “Yes, it is negative because it might be child labour behind it 
and slavery but ...” (Jenny), “I know it‟s not right, I know that you can make a direct comparison but ...” (Susan), “yes, you 
are guilty, you are part of the action, your fault might be very minor but still ...” (John). In a nutshell: the decisive element of 
                                                          
8
 This interviewee began his degree with the aim of working for the World Bank and one day becoming the chief economist at this 
institution. With degrees from highly reputable universities, this might be a realistic aim. Interviewees with a student status were chosen 
based on their career ambitions: these might indeed be the people shaping world politics in the near future. 
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interviewees‟ social representations of severe poverty and how they construct themselves as ethical in this discourse is 
introduced after the “but”. 
The belief that one‟s own group is unfairly advantaged is threatening. Significantly, it is not so much about the issue of 
inequality in general; troubling is not the idea that „the other‟ group has less than it should, but rather that „the own‟ group 
has more than it should and must therefore be considered as being unfairly advantaged (Chow, Lowery & Knowles, 2006). 
Furthermore, how much more threatening to an ethical self must the idea be that this issue of us having more than we 
should is embedded in a long history of „European normality‟? If one examines the research done seeking to explain the 
actions of the Righteous Gentiles, who seriously risked their own lives rescuing people during WWII, the most important 
motivational factor seems to have been that of „helping another‟, which presupposes equality: “I did nothing unusual; 
anyone would have done the same thing in my place” (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, p. 113). “It was easy to do because it was 
our duty.” (Geras, 1996, p. 29) “There was no question […] you could do nothing else; it‟s as simple as that.” (p. 24) “It 
was a natural thing to do.” (p. 41) In a nutshell: The rescuers did not rationalise, did not construct persons in need as 
„others‟, did not blame the victims and did not engage in acts of cognitive polyphasia; they could think of no reason not to 
act. 
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Appendix I 
 
I. 
Cosmopolitans 
II. Political 
Activists 
III. Religious 
Believers by 
Self-Definition 
IV. Believers in 
a Just World 
V. Represen- 
tatives of the 
Middle Class 
VI. Neoliberal Aspirant  
High Achievers 
Assessment of 
the most pressing 
contemporary 
problem, when 
asked directly 
Global poverty National issues in their countries: environmental issues, 
unemployment, homeless people in „their own‟ countries, 
legal human rights issues (discrimination of gays, restriction 
of freedom of press and speech), global security (fear of 
terrorist attacks in own country) 
Result of my 
interview analysis  
Coherent Incoherent, 
when it comes 
to topics and 
issues which are 
of high personal 
importance (e.g. 
questions of 
loyalty towards 
conservative 
parents) 
Extremely 
incoherent 
  
Knowledge about 
GIO 
Well informed Mixture of 
knowledge and 
opinion 
Opinions: facts 
constructed 
around an 
„ethical self‟; 
extremely 
incoherent 
Purely opinion 
(admit freely that 
they do not even 
read 
newspapers, 
watch news etc.) 
Opinions (but 
they believe 
that they are 
well informed) 
Well informed or no 
knowledge/opinion at all 
Assessment of 
the GIO:  
GIO as highly 
unjust; Africa as 
the example per 
se of global 
injustice 
GIO as highly 
unjust;  
Strong case of 
cognitive 
polyphasia; 
“GIO as unjust 
but  ...” 
GIO as just GIO as just GIO as unjust 
Reasons for Purely West: More abstract: Cognitive Mainly domestic Purely Purely domestic factors 
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African Poverty global 
institutional 
order, e.g. WB, 
IMF; WTO 
(strong 
emotional 
undertone: “We 
do the same as 
when we were 
colonialists.”) 
 
capitalism, free 
trade; (“You are 
complicit. There 
is no way to get 
around it.”) 
„cracks‟ when it 
becomes 
personally 
important, e.g. 
touches 
questions of 
loyalty; 
polyphasia: 
opinions about 
arms trade etc. 
stand parallel to 
explanations in 
purely domestic 
factors; “natural 
development” 
factors 
(corruption, 
mismanagement, 
irresponsible 
deals between 
African 
governments 
and 
multinationals); 
new information 
about unjust GIO 
as shocking; 
domestic 
factors; 
defence of the 
GIO; 
(corruption, 
mismanagement) (they 
„blame the victims‟ and 
claim that it‟s down to 
„African incompetence‟ 
but acknowledge by the 
same time the role of the 
EU and reflect Europe‟s 
colonial past) 
Construction of 
African Other  
Respectful 
Constructions 
of Africans as 
distinct but not 
different  
According to the type, the „African Other‟ is constructed in a specific way as „Other‟ 
 
When and how do 
people refer to 
children/animals? 
“You feel like a 
baby, like a 
child, you can't 
really 
communicate 
anything 
sophisticated, 
you know, in 
your own 
country, you are 
pretty well read, 
but then you go 
to another 
country, and 
you just can't, I 
felt really stupid 
[working in 
Tanzania].” 
 
 
“You can't just 
go around and 
say no more 
child labour, 
because then 
they go into 
prostitution, and 
you are even 
more 
responsible 
because that is 
even worse than 
working in a 
sweatshop.” 
“It [colonisation] 
is like having a 
child and 
looking after 
them and telling 
them what to 
do, maybe not 
looking after 
them well, but 
organising them 
and telling them 
what to do and 
then [after the 
process of 
decolonisation] 
leaving them, 
saying right, 
sort yourself 
out, now.” 
 
“In Europe, we 
are a lot of steps 
ahead of Africa, 
and you can help 
them a little bit, I 
mean, like a 
small child, you 
cannot leave it 
alone and it will 
not grow up 
without help.” 
“This is why 
the schemes 
like adopt a 
donkey work, it 
is this specific 
thing, I did that, 
adopt a child, 
so I am 
responsible for 
this bit of good, 
and it is 
consistent.” 
“Maybe I am 
inhibited 
because it is 
not politically 
correct 
because it 
would be 
stupid to say 
people in 
Africa are all 
like monkeys, 
they do 
everything 
slower, but it is 
also culture.” 
“If [Taiwan] keeps 
developing and the 
children there are going 
to school and they are 
not going to sew any 
shirts for H&M anymore, 
then [rich countries‟ 
companies] are probably 
just going to Angola, 
there are probably 
children everywhere to 
do this.” 
 
Acknowledgement 
of own colonial 
history 
“It is caused by 
us.” 
Link between 
past/present: 
GIO 
“It wasn‟t me, I 
am not even 
from a colonial 
country.” (turn 
from British to 
Australian 
identity) 
“It wasn‟t me.” “It wasn‟t me 
and there must 
be a 
threshold.” 
“Who cares [about 
poverty caused by us], 
kick them [people from 
the former colonies] out 
of the Netherlands.”  
Awareness of own 
privileges 
“My privileges 
are based on 
their 
exploitation.” 
“Rich countries 
got rich by 
consuming the 
Third World‟s 
resources.” 
 “Rich people 
studied hard and 
deserve their 
wealth.” 
“People die 
every day in 
the UK as well, 
we are mortal, 
get real.” 
“The GIO is good for us 
– so, leave it like it is.” “I 
didn‟t ask for what you 
call privileges – why not 
enjoy them?” 
 
Solvability of the 
problem 
Severe poverty 
could easily get 
eradicated if the 
political will 
existed. 
Severe poverty 
could get 
eradicated if the 
political will 
existed. 
Yes Maybe Maybe Yes 
Responsibility: 
does the issue 
have to be solved 
in general? 
Yes Yes Only African 
governments 
are responsible; 
strong thinking 
in national 
boundaries, all 
knowledge 
Not really Not really No 
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about the GIO 
becomes 
irrelevant 
Responsibility on 
an individual level 
Definitely  Restricted Duty of 
assistance 
Only if you harm 
directly, 
personally, 
intentionally 
Only if you 
choose  to feel 
responsible 
No 
Reported 
emotions 
Moral outrage, 
anger, personal 
guilt,  
Only one 
interviewee 
reports anger; in 
general: anger 
as an unuseful 
emotion 
Sadness, pity makes them feel 
“bad” but 
shocked when 
confronted with 
severe poverty 
makes them 
feel “bad”; 
being 
confronted with 
severe poverty 
does not 
arouse 
emotions, e.g 
going on a 
organised 
tourist 
township tour 
(does not even 
appear in their 
narrative if not 
asked explicitly 
Does not arouse any 
emotions 
How do they deal 
with politically 
disinterested 
friends? 
Try to convince; 
avoid people, 
cancel contact; 
strong inner 
conflicts 
“I don‟t have to 
talk all the time 
about what 
makes me tick.” 
– They just talk 
about other 
subjects. 
   “I would still talk to my 
friend even if she would 
work for an NGO and 
start to ride a bike.” 
Do they blame 
their fellows for 
their inactivity? 
blame strongly 
their fellows 
and reflect the 
irrationality of 
this act 
no (blame as a 
very unuseful 
emotion) 
Yes (might use 
the same 
arguments to 
blame their 
fellows and also 
to defend their 
own inactivity) 
No – but blame 
e.g. the Pope 
No – but blame 
Bill Gates 
No 
Personal History 
of Discrimination  
Reported discrimination at an early age, which makes them feel 
„different‟ from other people: 
 Discrimination as a 
teenager (“too rich”) 
 Experience is transferred to 
political setting 
Experience is 
transferred to 
broader setting 
with a 
humanitarian 
approach 
Interpretation 
stays on 
personal level 
  
Political 
awakening 
Reflected about 
reasons for 
their way of 
thinking, which 
they consider 
as an important 
issue for 
themselves; 
conclusion: was 
„breast-fed‟ to 
them through 
parents and 
their parents‟ 
history (literally 
from the minute 
they were born) 
Process of 
politisation 
started when 
they were young 
adults as a 
„political 
awakening‟; they 
stress the 
importance of 
„political role 
models‟ like 
lecturers, friends 
whom they 
consider to be 
authorities; 
A rather 
humanitarian 
approach to 
„problems of the 
world‟. 
Interested in 
issues, which are 
constructed as 
„humanitarian‟ 
but not 
„political‟ones 
(“Why do people 
deserve to live in 
severe 
poverty?”) 
No No 
Motivation for 
Action 
Attempt to 
make „peace‟ 
with the world, 
hence: fight for 
justice 
Change the 
world how 
oneself would 
like to see it 
Fulfilment of 
Catholic 
requirements 
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 Developed a 
positivel 
marginality: feel 
different from a 
lot of their 
fellows/ deviant, 
odd, able to 
take the 
perspective of 
the „Other‟ 
     
Non-White, non-
European self-
chosen friends 
Yes No (no non-White friends who were raised in non-European countries)  
Action Become 
professionals, 
work unpaid in 
their profession; 
speak out in 
any every-day-
life situation, try 
to raise 
awareness 
wherever, 
whenever 
Give up to 20% 
of their salary to 
groups working 
on structural 
change; become 
a member of a 
party, organise 
public 
discussion; go to 
protests 
Go to protests, 
sometimes buy 
fair-trade 
products; 
donate 
sometimes 
They donate 
money if they 
have a certain 
surplus (e.g. are 
not saving for a 
world trip); they 
are willing to get 
persuaded by 
friends to go to 
protests; 
Work as a 
professional in 
a poverty relief 
organisation 
(accidentally), 
donate money 
(interviewee 
framed the act 
as “adopt a 
donkey”), got 
reluctantly 
involved in 
fundraising 
activities for 
Tsunami 
victims in East 
Asia because 
of social 
pressure from 
friends 
Not concerned about 
political problems at all, 
do not do or have 
intentions of doing 
anything: it might 
happen by chance that 
they buy clothes which 
are produced under fair 
conditions – but 
consider it to be an 
unimportant issue; 
another interviewee 
works as a voluntary 
teacher in southern 
Africa because of the 
„scenery‟ (to gain 
experiences none of his 
friends have) but not 
because of the „charity‟ 
aspect 
 
Analytical level: 
self 
No need for 
ethical self, 
although ethics 
of high 
importance 
Oneself as the 
warrior for the 
good 
Strong need for 
an ethically 
immaculate self 
Oneself as a 
good person, in 
case of doubt: 
onself as 
helpless and 
“dumb”  
Oneself just 
does what 
others do; in 
case of doubt: 
uninformed 
and helpless 
No need for ethical self 
in this context; life as 
„survival of the fittest‟, 
ethics as an obstacle on 
the way to success 
Memo Claim to be not 
materialistic 
and it seems to 
be coherent: 
work unpaid in 
profession they 
are trained in, 
not even 
enough money 
for a flat by 
themselves/ 
couch surfing at 
a family 
members‟ place 
and consider 
themselves as 
being 
privileged;  
 Claim to be not 
materialistic but 
live in the most 
luxurious 
district/student 
hall  of the city; 
2 out of 3 
interviewees 
quit their 
favourite 
subject for 
another one 
which might pay 
better (one quit 
anthropology for 
law; antoher 
one maths for 
economics) 
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